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Executive summary
This paper considers the case of Angola as an
institutionally weak state.  It is intended to contribute
to the research project Institutionally Weak States:
Context, Responsibilities and Responses, undertaken
by the Peace, Security and Human Rights department
of FRIDE.
The analysis seeks to respond to key questions about
Angola posed in the project’s guiding purposes and
methodology. These appear in three clusters:
1. What are the historical taproots of conflict in
Angola, and of its weak uneven state and political
institutions?
2. What formal and informal forces and incentives are
at work in Angola’s territorial political economy
that affect state and political resilience or
weakness?   
3. What aspects of the integration of Angola’s political
economy into international systems may help explain
the persistence of weak state and political
institutions?
After addressing these questions, the paper suggests
ways European and other international decision-
makers might look afresh at notions of state weakness
in general, and at the case of Angola in particular.   
Studying the Angolan case may contribute to policy
about weak states, but perhaps not along customary
lines.
First, the Angolan case suggests the limited value of
scoring and ranking states, as if they were commodities
or football clubs. For example, influential think-tanks
in the USA have classified post-war Angola as a
completely ‘failed state’,1 a ‘severe’ case of a low-
income country under stress2 and most recently as a
‘critically weak’ state, 11th of the world’s current worst
cases.3 Yet another high-profile forum, Foreign Policy
magazine, has for years rated Angola as well outside
the ranks of the seriously weak and unstable.  Given
appeals for clarity and consensus among Western
policy elites, this discord and confusion about an
important client state is noteworthy.  
Second, the Angolan case suggests that confining
attention to politics ‘onshore’ leads to explanatory
dead-ends.  That is because Angola’s political economy
is extraverted. Key processes take place ‘offshore’, in
supra-national realms.  Drawing attention to the
extraversion of places like Angola is all the more
important because influential ‘expert’ organisations
like the World Bank consistently fail to do so.4
Third, Angola’s case suggests the need to probe
common assumptions like the ‘resource curse’.  Many
hold that oil revenues trigger bad politics and
instability; among cruder versions is that of a pundit
of the Financial Times: ‘The very presence of oil
turns law-abiders into thugs, and pushes nations
backwards into chaos.’5 Yet recent comparative
research finds that oil wealth, on the contrary, tends
to stabilise regimes.  Hence pursuit of general ‘laws
of petro-politics’ is a dead end; it is more useful to
look for patterns case by case in their social and
historical settings. Angola may show signs of ‘path
dependence’, but oil was only one factor laying down
the path.
Fourth, and perhaps most urgently, the case of Angola
calls attention to democratic deficits generated by the
hydrocarbon industry not only in fragile peripheral
states but also in advanced industrialised countries.  It
1 USAID/Iris Center 2004, Proposed Typology in Order to Classify
Countries Based on Performance and State Capacity, College Park: Iris
Center, University of Maryland
2 World Bank IEG 2006, Engaging with Fragile States. An
Independent Evaluation Group Review of World Bank Support to Low-
Income Countries Under Stress, Washington, D.C: World Bank
3 Rice, S. and S. Patrick 2008, Index of State Weakness in the
Developing World, Washington DC: Brookings Institution
4 See for example Harrison, G. 2005, ‘The World Bank, Governance
and Theories of Political Action in Africa’, British Journal of Politics
and International Relations, 7, 240–260
5 Amity Shlaes, ‘In Poorer Nations, Oil Resources Can Be a Curse
Upon the People’, Financial Times, 20 June 2004
illustrates the power of the oil industry – and the
national elites who depend on it – to corrupt and
undermine the legitimacy of whatever political system
it touches.  Yet rules and institutions governing global
financial flows, tax regimes and the environment
continue being shaped to suit corporate interests,
especially those of the hydrocarbon industry. The risks
to democracies young and old are serious. 
This paper draws on research and commentary by
others, and on information and views obtained in 2008
by the author in interviews with Angolans, and
specialists working on issues such as revenue
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Globalised Angola –
the past
What forces have driven Angola’s emergence as a
nation and polity?  How have they shaped its economy,
social identities and politics?  This chapter offers a
short overview, laying out the background to later
chapters focused on the main research questions.
Conventional wisdom holds that state fragility in Africa
stems chiefly from the inner drives of elites themselves.
They are in the dock as greedy, corrupt, scornful of
sound policy and driven by primitive ethnic rivalries. Yet
in a political economy like Angola’s, where Western
interests have set the ground rules and incentives for
five hundred years, the power of such essentialist views
to explain anything is not great. Angola’s polity may be
better understood by assessing the interplay of a
number of factors: 
• unremitting violence, both overt and structural;  
• an economy geared to serve outside interests;  
• a state apparatus and politics based on generations
of dependent, territorially weak, militarised,
centralised and corrupted processes designed for
colonial purposes and thus ipso facto anti-
democratic;
• inequalities generated by uneven and extraverted
development;
• public goods and services provided chiefly in response
to elites, and lacking any grounding in transparent,
democratic processes;
• a political space for associational life (‘civil society’)
that is severely confined and largely de-politicised.
Overt and structural violence
In the twentieth century, Angola enjoyed only about
twenty years without war. This was the period 1941
to 1961, between the last colonial military
campaigns and the first open anti-colonial revolts.
However, Angolans in daily life have for generations
faced less overt forms of violence: repression,
alienation and preventable poverty. Such violence
helped subordinate colonial subjects and organise a
predatory economy.
In the four decades following 1960, Angola went
through spasms of open warfare, reaching crescendos
in the 1980s and 1990s. Against such violence and
chaos, Angolan citizens had few defenses; most
hunkered down, pursued survival strategies, especially
taking flight across borders or to urban areas.  Elites
faced few incentives to end this disorder and many to
turn it to their own advantage. 
Angola’s emergence to self-determination took place
amidst geo-political contention.  First, facing
setbacks in Vietnam and insurgencies elsewhere, the
United States sought to contain and roll back
communism. It found itself typically wrong-footed
when in 1974 its Portuguese client regime collapsed,
largely under the burden of its wars in Africa.
Second, facing new and successful assertiveness
among oil producing countries, the US government
had few hesitations about using force to set the terms
of access to Angolan oil. Foreshadowing its invasion
of Iraq three decades later, it opened a covert war in
Angola, making use of regional proxies in Zaire and
South Africa.  
Yet throughout this assault, corporate power took a
different position.  American corporations pumped and
re-sold Angolan oil, furnished Angola with Boeing
airliners and facilitated capital flight to Wall Street
and tax havens. By trading with the Angolan enemy,
they easily recouped the hundreds of millions spent on
making war against it.
Today that US-led covert war to ‘roll back’ communism
is referred to as a civil war -– thus airbrushing away its
geopolitical drivers.  While contentious politics in the
post-independence period were probably inevitable in
Angola (as in many other African polities), the
duration and destructive force of the conflict can only




The hasty and vengeful departure of most Portuguese
settlers in 1975 and the onset of expanded warfare
triggered the collapse of most formal industry and
commerce.  From a high degree of self-reliance, Angola
began to import food and other basic goods,  mainly
those needed by city dwellers.  Small farmers faced a
‘goods famine’, thereby reducing incentives and means
to produce surpluses.  The war, and resulting forced
urbanisation, were the final blows to a sophisticated
commercial agrarian economy.  The post-colonial
period might just as accurately be termed the ‘post-
agrarian’ period.  
Turbulence and discontinuity have been Angola’s fate.
Its leading exports (slaves, rubber, sisal, coffee) have
boomed, then gone bust.  Its development strategies
(captive dependency, import-substitution, settlement
schemes, Soviet-style planning) have come and gone.
These cycles left behind few capacities, traditions,
infrastructure or institutions for periods that followed.
There was little Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’,
as the losses swamped out the gains. What has
remained constant, however, is the commanding
position of foreign capital, allied with repressive and
administrative powers of the state.
Weak and illegitimate political
institutions
Angola’s systems of administration developed
according to Portuguese law, custom and
organisational capacities. Those systems were weak.
Under more than forty years of dictatorship and a
bizarre creed that the colonial order was legitimate
and sustainable, government became more rigid,
centralised and corrupted.  In rural areas the state was
present in only rudimentary ways, if it was present at
all. Alongside formal institutions were many informal
norms of the Portuguese police state, claims of
privilege by petty officials and grand corruption by
senior officials including the military.  Apart from
churches, sports clubs and a few charities, there was no
formal associational life.  Political activism in civil
society was outlawed.
Organised expressions of nationalism emerged among
intellectuals in Luanda and provincial towns.  Violent
Portuguese counter-measures following spontaneous
upheavals in 1960 and 1961 sent many nationalists
into exile.  Nationalist parties themselves showed little
internal coherence or anchoring among Angolan
citizens broadly. One Angolan political analyst put it as
follows:
‘Although [ national parties’] programmes proclaimed
democratic liberties as objectives of the struggle, none
of them conducted themselves in ways that would
guarantee pluralism. […] Within each organisation,
conditions of tolerance and openness to political
debate [were] nonexistent.’6
In these and other ways, Angolan anti-colonial politics
foreshadowed the autocratic and violent political order
of the post-colony. The nationalist leadership inherited
no institutions or traditions on which to build a
responsive bond or social contract between citizens
and the state.  Even if economic collapse and war had
not occurred, building such a new political order would
have posed immense challenges. But that positive
scenario was eliminated from the outset; Angola’s
institutional fragility was in this sense ‘over-
determined’. 
Social identities and inequalities
Until the late 1800s, Angola was not a country but
merely a string of coastal enclaves. Only in the 20th
century did its inland territory gain political
boundaries and infrastructure.  Several distinct zones
arose around crop and labour systems, transport
corridors and marketing networks.  Out of fragmented
socio-linguistic groupings, major ethnic blocs
crystallised as follows (Portuguese estimates of each
2
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6 Gonçalves, J. 2003, O descontínuo processo de desenvolvimento
democrático em Angola, paper presented at CODESRIA Conference,
Gaberone, Botswana, 18/19 October 2003 [trans. D.S.]
one’s proportion of the country’s population in 1960
are given in parentheses):
a) in coffee-exporting north-western zones and the
Cabinda enclave, a diverse range of peoples
speaking dialects of ki-Kongo (13 %);
b) in a north-central band running from Luanda to the
east, where cotton was grown for export, peoples
speaking dialects of ki-Mbundu with increasing
admixtures of Portuguese (22 %);
c) in a mixed farming (maize, beans etc) zone
extending from the central coast into the central
highlands, peoples speaking dialects of umBundu
(37 %).
As elsewhere in Africa, missionaries transcribed and
codified languages and other cultural markers, thereby
‘inventing’ tribal identities. Through their churches,
schools, health posts and charitable works, Protestant
missions quietly competed with the dominant Catholic
system, which colluded with Portuguese colonial order.
The churches’ resulting social networks strongly
shaped Angola’s regionalised and ethnically-charged
politics. Leaderships of the three main nationalist
parties – the FNLA in the Northwest, the MPLA in
Luanda and the north-central zone and UNITA in the
central highlands - emerged from respectively Baptist,
Methodist and Congregationalist institutions.7
Apart from these ‘horizontal’ divisions, there was
marked ‘vertical’ segregation.  Foreign-based rentiers,
followed by various strata of settlers, formed the top of
the social pyramid. African hierarchies were dominated
by a longstanding Creole merchant elite. Most members
of that elite were categorised as assimilados (with minor
privileges and subaltern status as colonial citizens)
distinguishing them from the indigenas, the caste of
permanently excluded Africans. There was further
stratification in rural areas, where the Portuguese had
arbitrarily created ‘advanced’ farmers, local policemen,
straw bosses and ‘traditional’ authorities –- although
their popular legitimacy was often in question.
Late in the colonial period, driven by government
taxation, forced labour systems, settler land-grabs and
the growth of commercial agriculture, most Angolans
had been absorbed into capitalism’s cash nexus as full
or part-time proletarians and petty producers. In
several agrarian zones, African strata of accumulating
smallholders had emerged, among them some of
Africa’s most advanced rural producers at the time. Yet
further advances for Angolans were blocked by denial
of education and by further confiscations of land by
settlers and corporations.
Conclusion
Over hundreds of years, Angola’s foreign overlords had
put in place a political economy based on overt and
structural violence, an ever-changing but lucrative
order serving chiefly a rentier class in the colonial
metropole and consumers in the USA and Western
Europe. Foreign interests built up a ‘limited access
order’ that restricted privileges and rents to a narrow
elite.8 The state mirrored social hierarchies based on
the restricted allocation of assets, economic predation
and a coercive, militarised approach to public order. 
Colonial and post-colonial elites showed no interest in
creating an ‘open access order’ based on citizenship for
all and competitive markets.  A path was laid down
around a weak but autocratic colonial state dependent
on outside powers.  Mediocre institutions and under-
skilled people were additional legacies.  Angolan
nationalist movements, their leaders imbued with
norms of a ‘limited access order’, and habituated to the
use of armed force, had no ready alternatives when
they assumed power.  
8 The terms ‘limited access order’ and ‘open access order’ are
discussed in North, D.C. and others 2007, Limited Access Orders in the
Developing World: A New Approach to the Problems of Development,
Working Paper 4359, Independent Evaluation Group, Washington DC:
The World Bank
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What forces entwine Angola in the world economic,
social, military and political order?  To what incentives
do Angolan elites mainly respond?  How do those elites
assert themselves in regional and global settings?
These are among the main questions addressed in this
chapter.
Oil and geopolitics 
In the short run
Oil became Angola’s top revenue-earner in 1973, a
mere five years after its first appearance in export
statistics and some 18 years after pumping began at
the country’s first commercial well. Oil radically raised
the political stakes. It led impoverished Portugal to
cling more violently to her colonies.  It encouraged the
United States to promote a devastating war against
Angola and at the same time make money from it. The
combined impact of those conflicts, rising revenues and
the massive political influence of the oil industry in
Western democracies have made oil decisive in
Angola’s political economy.  
Angola’s case illustrates the oil industry’s geo-political
privileges. It gets a laissez-passer across even the best-
guarded ideological boundaries. Until 1974, western
oil firms’ revenues bankrolled the Portuguese war
effort. Yet when the Portuguese departed, those same
oil firms effortlessly switched their allegiance to the
triumphant African leadership in Luanda. The White
House worked hard to stop the sharing of oil revenues
with the ‘Marxist Leninists’, yet American oil
companies easily sidestepped those pressures and had
no qualms about cultivating cordial and profitable
relations with the new ‘leftist’ government.  Indeed,
before the US Congress, a senior American oil
company executive defended its tax and royalty
payments on grounds that they enabled the Angolan
government to improve popular living conditions, the
very claim the ‘Marxist Leninists’ made to legitimate
their struggle.9
Five of the world’s eight largest corporations –
Chevron, BP, Exxon/Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and
Total - created the hydrocarbon sector in Angola. They
continue to expand their stakes there to the present
day.  Alongside some smaller ones such as the Italian
ENI/AGIP (27th largest corporation in the world), they
wield not only technical but also financial and political
power in Angola and in geo-political spheres in which
Angola is embedded.  
Angola’s case can be understood in light of the
commanding influence the hydrocarbon industry holds
over the political classes in many Western
democracies, especially the United States.  That
industry finances political parties, fields thousands of
lobbyists and shapes public debate and opinion through
the media and think tanks.10 Also in Western capitals,
hydrocarbon-exporting dictatorships and sheikdoms
make their presence felt in spending power and in
regiments of public relations operatives.  For their part,
western politicians pay close attention to the wishes of
those autocracies, sometimes blocking probes into their
corrupting influence in Western public life. According
to a leading former oil executive, Western governments
subsidise the hydrocarbon industry to the tune of $200
billion a year.11
Oil industry power affects geopolitics via national
governments, but also via the scaffolds of global
governance. The industry codifies and enforces
international financial and legal mechanisms
matching corporate requirements.  Among crucial
mechanisms are offshore financial centres that shield
oil revenues and personal wealth from taxation.
National governments also promote hydrocarbon
9 Oliveira, R. S. 2007, Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea, New
York: Columbia Univ Press, p. 182
10 See for example: Oil Change International.   http://priceofoil.org
11 Former British Petroleum CEO Lord Browne, cited in Fiona
Harvey ‘Axe fossil-fuel handouts, says Browne’ Financial Times, 2
November 2008
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investments with World Bank loans.  They deploy
naval, air and ground forces to secure oil shipments
and to protect oil-producing client states. Western
governments have regularly promoted oil interests
through covert action or open invasions. In Angola’s
case, the United States provided very few of its own
forces, opting instead for a covert war by way of
national and regional proxies.
In Angola, the political class resides onshore but is
anchored financially offshore. Its power depends on its
partnership with oil corporations and the technical,
financial, diplomatic and military resources they
provide directly or effectively guarantee.  Yet the
partnership is not one of equal risks and benefits. For
example, the terms of Production Sharing Contracts
cushion oil corporations against price fluctuations,
thereby exposing Angola to most risks of income
volatility.12
Companies’ technical and financial control prevents
outsiders, Angolan authorities included, from knowing
with any precision what actual oil output and profits
are. Shielded by national and supra-national rules
crafted through massive lobbying, oil corporations use
transfer pricing and bank secrecy to put their revenue
beyond anyone’s tax jurisdiction.  An industry expert
notes: ‘In the Gulf of Guinea, the foreigners pump the
oil, and sell it to themselves (often keeping two sets of
books, and squirreling away the difference in Swiss
bank accounts).’13 An IMF report estimates that Gulf
of Guinea oil exporting governments lose about half the
value of oil actually exported.14 A report on tax losses
to mineral exporting poor countries concludes that
‘there is plenty of evidence that through a combination
of hard-nosed negotiating tactics and the use of
sophisticated offshore financial products and services,
royalty payments for such resources to developing
countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, have
been far lower than they should be.’15
In short, Angola may be as much sinned against as
sinning.  Its treasury, just as treasuries elsewhere,
including those of richer countries where oil companies
are headquartered, is not receiving a fair share. 
In international domains today, corporations
effectively face only ‘soft law’ - that is, moral
pressures to operate transparently; whereas in
Angola itself they are legally forbidden to reveal key
information. Angola remains outside the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative, although in 2004
it began to release somewhat more information on
oil revenues.16 The largest operators in Angola are
among the industry’s worst performers when it
comes to publishing what their operations actually
yield in profits or what payments they make to the
government.17 This basic bargain among elites thus
rests on a mutually assured denial of information to
the public.
For their part, oil corporations require a credible
sovereign state, one that is solid enough to comply
with contracts as enforced by international lawyers,
judges and mediators and to exercise a monopoly of
coercive power in zones relevant to the corporations.
Thanks to oil revenues, the Angolan state has become
capable of both. It remains dependent and unevenly
developed, but has built alliances with colluding
political and corporate actors abroad.  As discussed
below, Angola’s political class has used its
partnerships to acquire its own technical capacities in
the oil sector, as well as capacities in military, financial
and media realms.  
12 Shaxson, N. 2005, ‘New approaches to volatility: dealing with
the “resource curse” in sub-Saharan Africa’, International Affairs, 81:2
13 Yates, D. 2004, ‘Changing Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment
in the Oil-Economies of the Gulf of Guinea’ in Rudolf Traub-Merz and
Douglas Yates (eds) Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea, Security &
Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development, Berlin: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung
14 Katz, M., and others 2004, Lifting the Oil Curse. Improving
Petroleum Revenue Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington
DC: IMF
15 ActionAid 2008, Hole in the pocket. Why unpaid taxes are the
missing link in development finance, London: Action Aid, pp. 17-18
16 Ferreira, P.M. 2008, State-Society Relations in Angola: Peace-
Building, Democracy and Political Participation, Initiative for
Peacebuilding, Madrid: FRIDE, p. 8
17 Transparency International 2008, Promoting Revenue
Transparency. 2008 Report on Revenue Transparency of Oil and Gas
Companies, Berlin: Transparency International 
In the longer run
Angola’s known oil and gas reserves are relatively
modest, being far smaller than those of Nigeria or
Saudi Arabia.  Its oil output is projected to peak in
2010.  Between 2015 and 2018, Angola’s petrodollar-
based national budget could flip from surplus to deficit
if no alternative sources of state revenue are found.
The hydrocarbon sector currently absorbs around
three-quarters of all investment but generates only a
fraction of one percent of all new employment.  By
contrast, the agricultural sector absorbs less than one
percent of recorded new investment18 but could
generate massive new employment. 
Should Angola persist in its current pattern of elite-
centred consumption and hydrocarbon-centred
production, it will probably face a serious downturn by
around 2020.19 The revenue shock triggered in 2008
by falling oil and diamond prices (accompanied in all
likelihood by accelerated capital flight) provides a
foretaste of what may lie ahead. The next decade could
see an abrupt end to rising expectations among urban
strata who aspire to stable middle class lifestyles.  The
current development model is thus a ticking political
time bomb. The coming decade will reveal whether that
bomb will be defused or not.
Other extractive industries and
land
Diamonds have linked Angola to world systems since
the early 1900s, but with impacts rather different from
those of the oil sector. Many diamond-digging firms are
active, most employing private or irregular armed
forces.  In principle a state monopoly managed under
formal sector rules, alluvial diamond mining also
involves informal trade and labour circuits. As of
2000, an estimated 300 to 350 thousand artisanal
diamond miners or garimpeiros were thought to be
active; yet even after a brutal government-led
campaign to suppress them, there were in 2007 at least
as many if not more garimpeiros.20
All these elements pose political and fiscal challenges
both to central authority and to international
monitoring.  Diamond-trafficking paid Unita’s bills
during its last nine years of war.  In 1994, an abortive
peace settlement allocated control over five diamond
areas to Unita; in 2002 this elite bargain was renewed,
this time with success.  Separatist movements in the
main diamond zones of Lunda North and Lunda South
have emerged, but have been held in check through
agreements among political and military elites about
each one’s shares of diamond revenues. Transparency
has been even weaker than in the hydrocarbon sector,
although UN and civil society pressures have brought
formal diamond trading circuits under a permanent
public spotlight. These get attention because they
involve major international players, such as the De
Beers monopoly.
Other extractive industries such as iron ore, granite and
marble are far less lucrative, but control over them is
likewise subject to limited access in the service of
internationalised elite bargains.  The same logic holds
for access to land. Upward pressures on global food
prices strengthen incentives for foreign corporations
such as Lonhro to acquire land suitable for farming or
ranching, either for direct use or for speculation.
Chinese investors are also among those showing active
interest in Angolan farmlands.   A land law enacted in
2004 protects small farmers only marginally,21 instead
favouring corporate interests. Such trends cast
shadows on the prospects for decent rural livelihoods
and an equitable distribution of income and wealth; on
the contrary, they set the scene for further socio-
economic polarisation and conflict.
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18 BPI 2007, Estudos Económicos e Financeiros – Angola,
Departamento de Estudos Económicos e Financeiros, Outubro, Lisboa:
BPI
19 Mitchell, J. and P. Stevens 2008, Ending Dependence. Hard
Choices for Oil-Exporting States, London: Chatham House (the Royal
Institute of International Affairs)
20 PAC 2007, Diamond Industry Annual Review for Angola 2007,
Ottawa:  Partnership Africa-Canada
21 Discussed in ‘A Questão da Terra em Angola. Ontem e Hoje’ F.
Pacheco (coord.), Caderno de Estudos Sociais No. 1, 2005, Luanda:
Centro de Estudos Sociais e Desenvolvimento; and ARD, Inc. 2007,
Strengthening Land Tenure and Property Rights in Angola. Land Law
and Policy: Overview of Legal Framework, Washington DC/Burlington
VT:  USAID/ARD
Integration in trade and
investment
By 1985, ten years into the post-colonial period,
Angola faced increasing disorder:  more war, further
deterioration of basic utilities and infrastructure, a
rural economy in collapse and volatility of oil revenues.
By 1986 these had shattered the dreams of Luanda’s
central planners about economic self-reliance,
including the substitution of imports with home-made
goods. Once a major exporter of food, Angola by 1990
was importing more than half its food needs, as well as
many other basic goods. 
Trade in imported goods became a key source of profit
for rich people and of informal employment for the
rest.  Licenses to import provided access to hard
currency credit; they thus became patronage plums,
with military commanders among the first to get the
fruit.  Informal commerce with Zaire and South Africa
flourished.  Thousands of Angolans became long-
distance traders, importing consumer goods by air
from Brazil, Portugal and the Far East.  
As illustrated in this chart, foreign direct investment
exploded, with profits and other outflows now
surpassing inflows in net terms.22
Consumer desires and consumer culture have since
mushroomed, fed by rapidly-growing publicity and
marketing industries in which Brazilian and
Portuguese firms dominate.  Advertising and consumer
images saturate national print and electronic media,
whose content is largely imported from Brazil, the US
and Portugal.  Wants, needs and aspirations are under
continual upward pressure as images of Western
lifestyles spread and intensify.
Chinese trade and investment have radically shifted the
pace and direction of Angola’s integration.  Total trade
volume has grown explosively, reaching US$ 25.3
billion in 2008, roughly 14 times what it had been in
2000. Angola is now China’s number one trading
partner in sub-Saharan Africa.23 Chinese business
presence is expanding, driven largely by national loans
and lines of credit tied to its national firms and
lubricated by elite interchange via trade fairs and semi-
Angola: ‘Failed’ yet ‘Successful’ David Sogge
7
22 UNCTAD 2009, FDI Statistics, Interactive Database,
http://www.unctad.org/
23 In 2008, China’s trade with Brazil, whose GDP is about 25
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official trade promotion agencies such as the
International Lusophone Markets Business Association
(ACIML). Competition among foreign suppliers of
goods and services is thus sharpening, affording
Angolan government elites yet more negotiating power.
Portugal remains, however, Angola’s chief commercial
supplier, as well as a major investor.  
Financial integration
Few countries are more globalised financially than
Angola. As of 1998, it was one of only seven economies
whose recorded gross external assets and liabilities
exceeded their recorded gross domestic products.24
Since 2002, thanks to an explosion of loans, credits,
capital flight and Angolan investments abroad, its
financial integration has only deepened.  
Angola’s engagement with world capital markets has
occurred without the mediation or blessing of the
Bretton Woods institutions; Angola has never taken an
IMF loan. However, in the late 1980s the government
began introducing some standard Washington
Consensus policy formulas, showing particular
enthusiasm for measures favouring upward
redistribution. These included a stop to consumer food
subsidies and the sale of public assets – all important
signals to domestic and foreign business interests that
the era of state socialism was at an end.  
Angolan financial surpluses have for decades excited
the interest of foreign banks and purveyors of credit –
an excitement reciprocated by Angolans seeking to put
their monies discretely offshore. Collusion between
foreign and national elites has made Angola a net
exporter of capital for decades. From 1985 through to
2004 its estimated capital flight totalled 216 percent
of recorded GDP, ranking it among the most severe
cases of financial haemorrhage in sub-Saharan
Africa.25
Outflows take place through a mix of corporate mis-
invoicing,26 bribes and simple transfers by wealthy
individuals.  Quantities of capital flight and uncollected
tax revenues are not known with precision.  That
massive information deficit is a deliberate outcome of
special privileges granted to offshore financial centres
by Western governments, in large part thanks to hard
lobbying and political contributions by the financial
industry.  These legal arrangements have helped make
the economic life and public governance more fragile
not only in Angola, but in many other places including
Western democracies.27
After 2002 Angola became a hot new destination for
the financial industry, backed by enthusiastic officials
from Western capitals. In 2007 the US Assistant
Secretary of State for Africa projected Angola as one
of the continent’s three main hubs alongside Nigeria
and South Africa.  A Western diplomat told a reporter,
‘There’s a general feeling that if we are not a player in
Angola in the next five years we will have missed the
best opportunity in Africa.’28 Official banks and export
credit agencies of Brazil, China, France, Germany,
Portugal and Spain have scrambled to extend new
credit, while Angola has settled old debts.  Private
banks and insurance companies arrive every year to set
up shop. 
World Bank assessments of Angola’s business climate
are not flattering, but pro-market American think
tanks give it relatively good ratings, chiefly for its mild
24 Lane, P. and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti 2001, ‘The External Wealth of
Nations: Measures of Foreign Assets and Liabilities for Industrial and
Developing Nations’, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 55, pp.
263-394. The data offered may not have included wealth held secretly.
25 Ndikumana, L. and J.K. Boyce, 2008, New Estimates of Capital
Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries: Linkages with External
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Borrowing and Policy Options, working paper 166, Political Economy
Research Institute, Amherst: University of Massachusetts.
www.peri.umass.edu/236/hash/61e07e4377/publication/301/.  Illicit
flows from Africa are poorly documented and therefore greatly under-
stated; see Kar, D. and D. Cartwright Smith 2009, Illicit Financial
Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006, Washington DC: Global
Financial Integrity
26 Over-charging on exports to Angola was the main form of trade-
based capital flight to the USA from 2000 to 2005.  Pak, S. 2006,
Estimates of Capital Movements from African Countries to the U.S.
through Trade Mispricing, Workshop on Tax, Poverty and Finance for
Development, University of Essex, 6-7 July 2006, Association for
Accountancy and Business Affairs
27 See documentation available on the websites of the Tax Justice
Network (www.taxjustice.net) and of Global Financial Integrity
(www.gfip.org).  
28 Alec Russell, ‘Investors sign up to Angola’s miracle’ Financial
Times, 22 August 2007
tax regime29 and deregulated trade.30 The US
government approves of its financial integration
measures, such as easy outward transfer of revenues.31
Indeed, more money continues to flow out of Angola
than goes in, as shown, for example, in data on foreign
direct investment in the period 2005-2007.32 Where
Angola’s money actually goes is not publicly known.
But if its revenues follow those of other oil exporters,
the chief beneficiaries are American.  In a study
entitled Recycling Petrodollars, three economists of
the US Federal Reserve conclude, ‘Although it is
difficult to determine where the funds are first
invested, the evidence suggests that the bulk are ending
up, directly or indirectly, in the United States.’33
Pioneered by Persian Gulf oil exporters, Sovereign
Wealth Funds are important new state vehicles for
managing petrodollars. In 2004 Angola created such a
fund, the Reserve Fund for Oil. However most of
Angola’s recorded offshore assets are managed by the
state holding company Sonangol.  That company’s core
business is oil, including major shares in oil firms in
Gabon, Congo and Equatorial Guinea, where it also
furnishes security advice.  But it has diversified widely,
including interests in Portuguese energy and banking
firms. It may soon become owner of some major media
in Portugal.  In Guinea-Bissau, one of its joint
ventures, Angola Bauxite, is investing hundreds of
millions in mining and port facilities.
Financial integration and self-assertion are thus well-
advanced. Even in the face of rising Chinese
competition, these arrangements have furnished
Western elites with several major desiderata:  further
diversification of petroleum supplies, increased
revenues to Wall Street and Western-held financial
corporations; and a burgeoning market for Western
exports and investment opportunities. For
collaborating Angolan elites, the rewards have also
been considerable. This incentive system is highly
geared to the short run and built on precarious
ecological and economic premises, but those things
have not made it any less compelling for participants.   
Having been integrated for a long time, Angola might
serve to illustrate the beneficial effects that market
fundamentalists claim about globalised finance.  But
those claims look spurious, and Angola’s case is merely
one of many.  Greater financial integration does not
improve long-term economic growth of poor countries,
as even a recent IMF study - with evident
disappointment - had to conclude.34 Tellingly, that
report’s data were gathered before poor countries
began to feel the impact of the global financial crisis.
As that crisis deepens, the damaging effects of
uncontrolled financial integration are now becoming
clear. 
Political integration
Financial and military power, and seasoned political
experience, have enabled Angola’s elites to negotiate
terms of engagement from positions of growing
strength. As European countries jockey for energy
security, and for lucrative markets for their goods and
services, their attention to Angola has risen.
With Western democracies
The misuse of Angolan oil revenues to advance the
interests of politicians and parties in Western Europe
and the United States is one of the more notorious
expressions of Angola’s political integration with
foreign political systems.  Despite high-level efforts to
keep the matter secret, sufficient information leaked
out regarding French oil company payoffs to African
and European politicians to trigger criminal
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29 Heritage Foundation 2008, Index of Economic Freedom.
Washington DC: The Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation
30 Cato Institute 2008, Economic Freedom of the World: 2008
Annual Report. Washington DC:  Cato Institute
31 US Department of State 2008, Investment Climate Statement
– Angola (2007),
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2007/
32 UNCTAD 2008, World Investment Report 2008, New York and
Geneva: UNCTAD, p. 294
33 Higgins, M., T. Klitgaard, and R. Lerman, 2006, ‘Recycling
Petrodollars’ Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 12: 9, New
York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
34 IMF Research Department 2007, Reaping the Benefits of
Financial Globalisation,  Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 
prosecutions in France.  Evidence that Angolan oil
revenues also taint US politics has been detected, but
the matter still awaits full investigation.35 A close
observer of African oil politics underscores what is at
stake in the Anglo-Saxon democracies:
‘In the rich English-speaking world the corruption is
probably not in the form of a grand unified French-
style state conspiracy, but a more privatised,
decentralised, nebulous rottenness, stemming from
those grand, generic offshore temptations which
insidiously poison our democracies through lobbying
and other, more nefarious schemes.  The higher the oil
price, the bigger the balloons of cash, and the greater
the threat to our democracies.  Once again, oil acts like
heroin: it feels good, but the final result is catastrophic.
This is not just more tedious foreign corruption.  This is
really dangerous stuff.’36
With global and regional institutions
Shortly after independence in 1975, Angola became a
member in good standing of the United Nations and its
affiliates. Only much later did it join institutions where
global economic rules are made: the IMF in 1989 and
the GATT/WTO in 1994. In the years immediately
after independence Angola participated as a torch-
bearer of third-world nationalism in such bodies as the
Non-Aligned Movement; today that interest has largely
evaporated. There is little enthusiasm for progressive
blocs such as Socialist International, despite Angola’s
having received much financial and diplomatic support
from Sweden and other pillars of social democracy.
The government shows only perfunctory interest in
formal African institutions such as the African Union,
the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and, since 1999, the Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS), a mainly
francophone body, often dormant, that facilitates
engagement with donors. 
Angola has been more visible in international platforms
where it has a direct stake.  Luanda has become the
headquarters of a recently-revived Nigerian initiative,
the Gulf of Guinea Commission, with joint economic
and security ambitions. However, it shows great
enthusiasm for the oil cartel OPEC, in which it became
a full member in 2007 and president in January 2009. 
In its regional politics, Angola usually acts unilaterally,
sometimes with force of arms.  Observers note a will to
enjoy hegemony over the region and to become a
‘kingmaker’ rivalling South Africa.37 These ambitions
have not gone unnoticed in Washington DC, where
alarm bells began to ring when Angolan armed forces
went in to rescue allied regimes in the Congos and
elsewhere. While some in Washington once saw Angola
as a source of ‘regional destabilisation’,38 such
anxieties have since given way to benign projections of
Angola as a useful regional policeman.
With the aid system
In contrast to most other sub-Saharan African
countries, donors and the aid system rarely mediate
Angola’s political integration. Business and NGO
leaders do not see the aid industry as a major
developmental force, and deplore the condescension
and conditionalities of the aid encounter.  One veteran
Angolan observer rejects the notion that, before it can
be properly aided, the country has to be integrated on
terms set by donors. Rather, Angolans wish to be
respected, not berated to accept the ‘bible’ of ‘good
governance, transparency and accountability’, when the
preconditions for such things are not present.39
Donors have therefore never exercised the kind of
power they have elsewhere in Africa.  Since the end of
the humanitarian emergency, their influence has fallen
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even further.  Staff of the European Commission have
noted that ‘As with other resource rich countries, the
scope for influencing the government of Angola in
general and on governance issues in particular is
limited.’40 According to one informant, the donors’
‘last stand’ was in 2003, when the government finished
drafting its Anti-Poverty Strategy paper (Estratégia de
Combate à Pobreza).  That official statement of
purpose now appears to be a dead letter.  A non-official
‘observatory’ set up with a donor subsidy in 2004 to
monitor government anti-poverty work is today
dormant.  
International agencies hesitate about confronting the
government, even when their own institutions are at
stake. In 2008 they offered few audible objections to
the closure, at government behest, of the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Luanda.
There have been exceptions to this timidity; the UN’s
Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing
and the UN Special Representative on human rights
defenders have published reports critical of
government actions. 
Only a few international development NGOs can be
counted on to express criticism. This was the case in
2007, when government bullying of four Angola human
rights NGOs triggered a protest from European
organisations.  Foreign powers like the United States
tend to give the Angolan government the benefit of the
doubt; indeed, robust defences of Angolan policy have
been heard from US diplomats. In general, however, the
‘international community’ tends to keep its collective
head down and its mouth shut.  
Between international agencies and Angolans there is
little love lost.  Surveys of opinion41 indicate low levels
of public confidence in the United Nations.  Its overall
political and humanitarian record has been mediocre
at best, in part because it lacked strong and consistent
backing from powerful member states, particularly in
the West.42
Military and security integration
Among fighting forces on the continent, Angola’s army
has had more experience in combat and in rapid
interventions.  Those facts, plus Angola’s enormous
spending power, make it an attractive partner for
foreign military or security officials and their
respective arms industries.
For decades, Angolan military, security and business
players have been buying arms and military/security
services in both official and shadow markets. Angolan
belligerents evaded UN sanctions in their purchases of
massive amounts of arms at premium prices.  Towards
the end of the war, non-governmental and official
researchers documented the huge scope of Angolan
integration with the global market in military goods
and services.43
Since the war’s end in 2002, the military and security
branches have invested more in military training,
facilities and other software; in means of surveillance
and control over civil unrest; and in the private provision
of security services. There are multiple-use goods and
multiple users.  For example, since 2004 Chevron has
used Israeli-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for
surveillance of territory, in collaboration with Angola’s
military. There is evidence of increasing competition
between Chinese and American military establishments
for opportunities to win Angola’s favours; both
American and Chinese training efforts have increased,
and joint Angolan-US military exercises, begun in 1997,
have now become routine.
Western military and police training and sales
programmes began in the 1990s. Spain’s Guardia Civil
worked with Angolan police forces from 1992 to 1998,
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followed by Spanish aid for prison services.  The US is
increasingly involved; in 2007, for example, it
supported the regional training (including counter-
narcotics) of 35 Angolan police officers. The Pentagon
began its first active programmes in 1997; today, joint
US-Angolan military exercises have become routine.
Talk of ‘terrorism’ suggests the influence of American
security discourse among Angolan security elites. 
Integration – conclusion
In a continent marked by extraverted political
economies, Angola’s is an extreme case.  Its main
export is produced increasingly offshore.  Most of what
it consumes is imported from abroad.  Financially it is
deeply tied to Western financial markets, and now to
Chinese banks as well.  Political and military leverage
at home and abroad depend on strategic cooperation
with foreign suppliers.  In short, Angola’s political
economy is deeply enmeshed with external circuits and
actors.
Under Portuguese rule, its economy was geared to
global markets thanks chiefly to agrarian exports.  That
output stimulated consumption, which fed back into
investment and further production onshore.  Oil and
war changed all that. They fuelled politics that
destroyed the agrarian economy and displaced the
population to urban areas, which are now the
demographic centre of gravity.  These urban enclaves
are poorly linked with local production systems;
earnings and investment capital depend on markets
driven by consumption (mainly of hydrocarbons)
elsewhere in the world, as well as by casino-like
speculation.
Domestic politics therefore have little to do with
reciprocal relations between citizens as payers of taxes
or producers of goods on the one hand, and a political
class in need of those taxes and goods on the other.
Crucial sources of political power stem from Angola’s
reliance on global systems that supply revenue, goods
and means of coercion - all taking place increasingly
under US diplomatic and military protection.
Integration offshore thus stabilises and shapes a
‘limited access order’ onshore, as described in more
detail in the following chapter.
Angola’s onshore
political economy
In what measure do formal institutions ‘onshore’ in
Angola account for state resilience or fragility?  What
patterns and rules of power operate informally through
or around them?  What incentives arise, particularly
among elites, to maintain or challenge these rules?
How might these incentives evolve in the future?  These
are among the main questions addressed in this
chapter.
Military and security systems
For generations Angola has been hammered by war, its
history ‘irrigated by the blood of the victims’.44
Angolan and non-Angolan actors in pursuit of power
and wealth have, before trying anything else, usually
taken paths of violence and coercion. The effects have
been cumulative. In response to the ‘rollback’ war
launched against it, the MPLA threw together, with
East Bloc help,45 a force that later grew into a
competent, battle-hardened army. Thanks to a US-led
crusade against it, to a flow of petrodollars and to a
free market in military goods and services, Angola is
today a highly militarised and ‘securitised’ place, one
capable of deploying forces affecting politics in other
African countries.
Relative to the size of its population, Angola’s military,
police and paramilitary forces are the largest in sub-




44 Pélissier, R. 1986, História das Campanhas de Angola.
Resistência e Revoltas 1845-1941, vol II, Lisboa: Imprensa
Universitaria, Editorial Estampa, p. 280
45 Cuba was an important source of military and non-military
technical assistance in the period 1976-1990.  See ‘Cuban intervention
in Angola’, http://en.wikipedia.org/. The Soviet Union, Vietnam and East
Germany also contributed technicians, material and funds. With the
exception of military capacities, little today remains of their influence.
As of 2005, close to half a million people were on the
payroll of the Angolan Armed Forces, although less
than a third of them were on active duty.  Many tens
of thousands46 more serve in regular and irregular
police forces, the Presidential Guard and the secret
services.
Alongside those public forces, private security
companies have grown. As of 2004, nearly two-
hundred private security agencies employed around 36
thousand people, mainly in Luanda and in diamond
mining zones. These firms have bought and sold in a
shadowy public-private market structured more by
political relationships (the leading security companies
having been acquired by senior military officers) than
by open competition. 
In formal terms, civilian politicians have always had
the upper hand over the Angolan military and security
branches. Informally, however, their authority has
depended on pacts with senior military officials. Such
pacts have been imperative since 1977, when a violent
coup attempt by security branch officials traumatised
the political class. That imperative grew in the 1980s
as Unita and its foreign backers intensified their war
against the government.  Effective, disciplined and loyal
armed forces became a fundamental project in state-
building.  Senior figures have paid close attention to the
recruitment, training discipline and compensation of
military and security officials. They have done so with
a close eye for the social make-up of the security
branches, in order to reduce risks of dissension and
disloyalty.   After purging a number of white and
mestiço officers from the army in the early 1980s, the
leadership changed its policy and took an inclusive
approach, recruiting officers of ethnic groups from
which opposition parties and their insurgent armies
drew their adherents. 
After the war’s end in 2002, the security sector
absorbed some of the 130,000 demobilised ex-
combatants. Incorporation of more than 5000 former
Unita soldiers and generals into the national army and
police force was an important gesture of reconciliation.
Training and upgrading have followed, often with
foreign support.  
The leadership has worked to cement officer corps’
allegiance by cultivating personal loyalties based on
both formal benefits such as promotions and pensions
and on informal benefits. In the wave of privatisations
of the 1990s, senior military figures acquired urban
real estate and former state farms.47 Their routes to
accumulation included access to discounted dollars
and to commercial brokerage positions, especially
quasi-monopolies over flows of certain imports or
exports - lucrative privileges obtained through
patronage.  Backed by substantial spending (some of it
off-budget), clientalist systems keep command
structures unified and loyal.48 Sub-streams of
patronage branching downward help cement political
allegiance in other levels of society.  With the important
exception of Cabinda, a modest majority of Angolans
claim to trust the armed forces.49
Otherwise, overt police coercion has been directed
chiefly toward those lacking all political protection:
migrant workers in diamond zones, low-income
residents living on prime urban real estate and
episodic protestors such as students. These
increasingly face ‘hybrid’ policing - joint operations of
formal police with private security services - a
‘privatised’ approach in which information is legally
unobtainable, complaint procedures become dead ends
and no officials can be held to account. Meanwhile, the
deployment of secret police and the use of informants
seem to be growing, penetrating even local NGO
networks. 
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Risks to public security in Angola are, at first glance,
serious. In successive waves of demobilisation since
1992, many tens of thousands of ex-soldiers have been
dumped into labour markets, where very few have
found decent jobs. Moreover, Angola is awash with
private firearms: 21 per 100 civilians, one of the
highest ratios in the non-Western world.50 Violent
crime is certainly present, yet its incidence is well below
what might be expected given the unfavourable
equation of firearms-plus-jobless youth. A 2007 survey
of Angolan businesses showed much lower incidence
and effects of theft and other crimes than elsewhere in
Africa.51 In contrast to the slums of Cape Town and
some Latin American cities, there are no criminal
gangs with monopolies of violence in certain zones.  
Politics onshore
Putting formal institutions at the service 
of informal power
According to its Constitution, Angola is a
parliamentary democracy.  It operates through
executive, legislative and judicial branches whose
separate powers allow for checks and balances among
all three. In formal terms, the public can make its voice
heard through multiple parties, civil society
organisations and public media.  However, this formal
framework is only loosely related to the ways politics
actually work.  Informal rules and relationships
prevail, usually behind the legitimating façade of
formal arrangements.
The reality is that Angolan politics pivot on the
President’s office, ‘Futungo’.52 It manages clientalist
systems through a state apparatus welded together at
many points with the dominant party, the MPLA. This
monopoly is expressed formally, such as in the
Executive’s powers to appoint or dismiss all officials of
the judicial branch, from the Supreme Court to the
Audit Court (Tribunal de Contas). But it also operates
informally, such as by stacking key bodies like the
National Electoral Commission with ruling party
adherents.  
Effective powers of the Parliament (Assembleia
Nacional) are highly circumscribed by its narrow
mandates, minimal resources and lack of financial
autonomy.53 Although dissent may be voiced and
legislation initiated there, Parliament has served
mainly as a platform for the ruling party, a function
that in formal terms is today absolute. The country’s
first elections in 1992 gave the MPLA 59 percent of
all seats; those of 2008 gave it 87 percent. For all
practical purposes, the status quo of the pre-1992 one-
party system has thus been restored.  Political debate
and checks-and-balances thus take place largely within
the precincts of the party/governmental leadership,
behind closed doors.
A formal legal system has never been accessible to
ordinary Angolans.  Today the judicial branch remains
weak and subordinated to central authorities. Its
deficits in staff and operating systems are gradually
being addressed. Courts enjoy a certain amount of
public confidence.54 But there are few precedents of
citizens bringing suit against the authorities.55
Meanwhile government is promoting less formal and
binding approaches to dispute settlement. In 2008, its
third year of operations, the Judicial Ombudsman’s
office (Provedoria de Justiça) registered 400 citizen
complaints. In the same year a senior official proposed
the creation of public and private Mediation Centres
(Centros de Arbitragem).  However, such bodies have
no mandates to enforce laws or impose legally binding
outcomes. Instead they serve to alert the authorities to
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problems without requiring them to find solutions.
Other semi-formal initiatives, such as provincial human
rights committees, are largely dormant.  
Through its command of the airwaves and powers to
intimidate or buy off critics, the regime controls and
colours the information available to most of the public.
Self-censorship is rampant. Comparative indexes
compiled by Reporters Without Borders and Freedom
House commonly rank Angola’s press freedoms among
the more restricted in Africa, though not among the most
restricted. A recent analysis by a veteran media and
human rights activist paints a somber picture of
independent media becoming further confined, drained of
staff and eclipsed by state and private media which churn
out pro-regime images and frivolous  entertainments.56
The public at large, and probably some in the political
class, are kept in the dark about essential political and
economic matters. Transparency about official budgets is
among the most restricted in the world.57 In these ways,
informed, open politics face major barriers. 
Sub-national politics
Territorial government has never been strong; forty
years of war weakened it further, even to the point of
extinction in some zones.  Humiliated for years by the
presence of a Unita-led ‘republic’ in the interior and
sensitive to political rumblings in Cabinda and the
Lundas, central authorities are hyper-alert to incipient
separatism.  They have shown political sophistication in
keeping provincial elites ‘inside the tent’, in a broad
informal coalition. Central authorities steer and
finance sub-national governance in layers down to local
levels. They appoint all senior sub-national officials,
and create or dissolve institutions (branches of
parastatal companies, funds, commissions,
programmes, etc.) according to their wishes.  While a
few may consult residents at local levels, every sub-
national government is accountable only upward,
ultimately to the top authorities in Luanda.  
Authority is centralised, but provincial deputies have
occasionally been granted discretionary powers.  In
negotiations with Unita, the MPLA expressed
willingness to allow the President’s choice of provincial
governors to be influenced by electoral outcomes.
Futungo has from time to time suspended provincial
leaders known to be corrupt and unpopular, but also
those known to be effective and popular (e.g. former
Prime Minister Lopo de Nascimento as ‘super’
authority over three southwestern provinces in the
1980s). 
Nevertheless, Luanda is now confident enough to try
re-organising the power pyramid again.  Since 2005,
with Brazilian conceptual and technical advice, a pilot
project for ‘decentralisation’ has been underway in 88
key districts, home to about 70 percent of the
population. In 2009, all of Angola’s 167 districts are
to receive US$ 5 million each to be spent according to
a locally-formulated District Master Plan approved in
Luanda. A Decree-Law of 2007 mandates public
consultation on local development plans and related
issues, thus opening modest official spaces for citizens’
voices to be heard at local levels.
However, forums for politics made by citizens
themselves are unwelcome. It is far from clear that
promised electoral competition at local levels will
change that.  The MPLA in any case has begun
preparing the ground in some detail; for example, to
meet gender balances mandated in law, wives of MPLA
officials are being groomed (training courses in Brazil,
etc.) for elected office. The authorities emphasise
gradualism in these kinds of political innovations, just
as they leave no doubt that significant powers will
remain in their hands.
Much more importance is attached to state
administration than to political life. The territorial
reach of state agencies remains weak, but performance
of some key tasks is growing stronger.58 The collection
of taxes, customs revenues and electricity payments is
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improving, from a low base.  The regime’s capacities to
get its messages across via radio, and limit alternative
messages, are strong, certainly contributing to the
MPLA’s landslide victory in the September 2008
parliamentary elections.  Other public sector tasks have
seen uneven advances: road surfaces and water
systems have been improved, especially in the urban
zones of salaried strata.  Indicators of formal schooling
- number of students, teachers and classrooms - had by
2008 more than doubled over 2002 levels.  Health
systems have also expanded, but results have been
mixed. Tuberculosis rates are rising and in 2007
cholera hit tens of thousands in Luanda alone.  
Expanded reproduction of autocratic rule
For Futungo, what is mainly at stake is its monopoly of
power. Indispensable to this purpose are its offshore
arrangements, chiefly with oil companies and their
(mainly American) political and military protectors.
Onshore, Futungo’s chief concern is to block the
emergence of any serious domestic challenge to its
rule, whether a separatist movement or a major
coalition of economic or political interests able to
sustain itself independently of central authorities.  
During the war years, the MPLA leadership ultimately
overpowered domestic rivals with both military
coercion and material persuasion. It gained allegiance
of former rivals by furnishing access to perks, property
and privileged means of extracting rents and access to
foreign exchange. These measures neutralised more
and more opponents, convincing most to ally
themselves to the MPLA government in an ever-
broader elite coalition. Those showing too much in-
group loyalty or reliance on foreign economic circuits
independently of Futungo would find themselves
suddenly denied official favours and frozen out. In the
mid-1990s this was the fate of a then substantial
cluster of prosperous Lebanese merchants, most of
whom subsequently left the country.  Aspiring new
business, professional or bureaucratic groups thus face
strong incentives to ally themselves vertically rather
than laterally, and to frustrate or quash rivals and their
proposals. 
The state enterprise Sonangol has been a crucial
instrument in the leadership’s hands. Created in 1976
as the national oil company, it is today a big and
successful holding company. Together with Angola’s
armed forces, it is a competent and robust institution
in a wider context of institutional decay and fragility.
A close student of oil and politics in the Gulf of Guinea
describes Sonangol as ‘the centrepiece in the
management of Angola's “successful failed state”.’59
With its deep pockets and solid backing from powerful
military and financial forces abroad, Futungo’s hands
are free – human and organisational capacities
permitting – to pursue its clientalist political project on
its own terms.  However Angola’s extraverted economy
and the post-war surge in foreign investment big and
small are creating new opportunities for accumulation
beyond the purview of the ruling party. These range
from formal sector business licenses and credit lines to
informal sector trading, labour and transport circuits.
With external business partnerships multiplying, some
observers thus see Futungo’s control over
accumulation onshore as not absolute but relative.60
Nevertheless, although deals between big Angolan
entrepreneurs and foreign businesses occur regularly,
central authorities work hard to maintain tight,
vertical control over access to main streams of revenue
and the assets that underlie them. Hence they act
routinely to frustrate horizontal alliances or major
enterprises (formal or informal) that might allow funds
and political resources to accumulate beyond their
control. 
Flows via the foreign aid system have created tensions.
During the war years, the government had ceded to
donors and humanitarian NGOs some control over
resources and access to populations. Today the accent
is firmly on state control, whether by diplomacy, co-
optation, bullying or imitation. Non-state actors and
projects receiving foreign aid are kept on a particularly
short leash. The MPLA and Futungo have advanced
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higher salaries and access to consumer credit, has
increased.
Despite the prosperity of salaried strata, the state’s
socio-economic base remains narrow and possibly
unstable. The post-1975 enclave economy is an
artifact of war and petrodollars.  The collapse of the
agrarian commercial economy put Angola at the mercy
of world prices of oil, food and credit.  State income
and expenditure have generally followed the ups and
downs of oil prices. At present, taxes on wages,
consumption and non-oil business activity account for
only a small part of state revenues.  Hence onshore
consumption and production are hardly a basis for
reciprocal politics binding the political class to
citizens.  
Oil dependence is commonly thought to make states
unstable. The causal chain is roughly as follows: oil
dependence -> breakdown of citizen-state reciprocity ->
political fragility -> war. But the Angolan case offers no
clear confirmation of this hypothesis; on the contrary it
is consistent with statistical studies indicating that oil
wealth tends to prolong and stabilise autocratic
regimes.63 Most rentier regimes ‘have generally avoided
the substitution of oil for statecraft.’64
An important part of statecraft is the redistribution of
rents to better-off consumers and formal sector
businesses.  This takes place unobtrusively by way of
low charges, and in some cases non-collection of
charges, for state-supplied housing, fuels, electricity,
water and air transport. Such de facto subsidies,
the ‘colonisation’ of the civil domain by creating
foundations and NGOs answerable to them.  Access to
benefit streams is also managed through such
patronage devices as the ‘Specialty Committees’
(Comités do Partido de Especialidade) created in
2004 as a means of drawing professionals, journalists,
technicians and other ‘intellectuals’ into the Party’s
orbit.61
A test of Angola’s elite bargains will be that of
presidential succession.  As of 2009 there is no evident
‘crown prince’. The choice of successor to President dos
Santos will fall to a ‘selectorate’ of senior political and
military figures.62 Toadying, back-stabbing and falls-
from-grace have long been part of Futungo court
politics, but current elite pacts appear to be broadly
robust. With no one faction seriously at risk, a smooth
succession process seems entirely feasible. 
Economic growth, political
sociology and state resilience
Economic growth onshore has accelerated since 2002.
It has reproduced some of the polarised and
outwardly-oriented patterns of Angola’s colonial past.
Guiding it are rules, plans and public subsidies
reflecting preferences of political elites and foreign
investors. The leadership talks frequently of
‘sustainable development’ but makes its choices
mainly according to ‘high modernist’ development
models of dubious sustainability seen in other rentier
settings such as the Persian Gulf. There has been a
surge in the creation of consumer needs, and, for
some, the satisfaction of those needs.  Beyond the
state/party nomenklatura, the lucky few include
members of business, professional and other
advantaged strata whose spending power, thanks to
61 That patronage system probably contributed to the failure of a
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a seat in Parliament in the September 2008 elections.
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reinforced by benefit schemes for elites (foreign
scholarships, medical treatment abroad, etc.) and
choices of investment (shopping malls, multi-lane
highways for Luanda, etc.) underpin their vertical
allegiances.  Some de facto subsidies, such as for fuel,
also reach low-income urban dwellers, and thus may
blunt some hard edges of inequality in cities.  
Crucially, the leadership’s patronage systems have
included elites in peripheral zones.  Here, ‘horizontal
inequalities’, ethnic loyalties and grievances against
‘Luanda’ can form a potent mix, as noted earlier about
Cabinda and the Lunda Provinces.  The social ‘reach’ of
patronage beyond elites is, however, not unlimited and
may risk falling short of rising expectations of the poor
majority.  Earlier surveys of public opinion suggest that
only a minority of people see their lives getting better.
Assuming Angolans see things as do citizens elsewhere
in Africa, they probably sense that poverty as they
experience it has worsened.65
In mobilising public revenues, onshore production and
exchange matter little in formal terms; indeed, many
economic circuits operate beyond the reach of the
authorities.  As in most of sub-Saharan Africa, the
unregistered ‘informal’ economy accounts for most of
the labour force and a sizable share of spending, saving
and investment.66 Conventionally seen as made up of
self-reliant entrepreneurs, Angola’s informal economy
is in fact composed of owners, owner-operators and
those earning wages or commissions. Only a minority of
participants in the informal economy are single, self-
employed entrepreneurs. 
Angola’s formal and informal economies do not exist in
separate compartments; they are better seen as two
dimensions of one interconnected whole. Most
unregistered economic circuits are subordinated to the
formal economy.  Participants in the informal economy
are not so much excluded from the formal economy as
adversely incorporated into it. Close study of goods
markets in cities reveals complex hierarchies of
informal businesses and workers dependent on formal
businesses and agents of the state.67 Also in the formal
economy, entrepreneurs setting up registered
businesses come from, or depend on contacts with, the
ruling party or its government agents.68
Official positions toward the informal economy tend to
vary according to the social power of those in question.
Poor petty traders, the majority of whom are female,
have always faced bullying and shakedowns by the
police, particularly the ‘economic police’ (Policia
Fiscal). By contrast, economic agents further up supply
chains can expect deference and cooperation.  Some of
these are owners of formal businesses whose sales and
labour depend on unregistered workers, brokers and
other agents. Illicit flows managed by elites, such as via
invoice mis-pricing or use of tax havens, evidently
escape formal regulation. 
In official utterances, the authorities are bent on
suppressing the informal economy, particularly its
expression in sprawling urban marketplaces. Yet for the
time being the informal economy’s existence is not at
risk. There are too many elite interests at stake in its
continuation. Its commercial domains are vital to
systems that move imported goods from wholesale
levels controlled by holders of franchises granted
through political patronage to consumers. It serves as
a social buffer or sponge to absorb the majority of
work-seekers and to curb organised, militant activism
arising from workers, whether formal or informal.
Can there emerge a social bloc capable of operating
outside the political class’s patrimonial systems? The
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question is disputed. In the early 1990s, some signs had
emerged of autonomous economic actors who had
‘taken advantage of vague definitions and small
openings in the law.’69 While some transporters and
farmers have indeed prospered, a critical mass of
entrepreneurs beyond state/party patronage systems
has yet to appear.  The veteran Angolan banker Mario
Pizzaro concludes: 
‘Angola’s business fabric is fragile and dependent.  This
fragility and dependence blocks the existence of a
critical mass capable of discussing and influencing
government decisions. A large part of Angolan
business people emanate from the ruling power bloc or
are directly or indirectly linked to that power.’70
The regime discourages business strata from operating
independently of its clientalist systems. At the same
time it has presided over the emergence of a ‘“new
class” created in the shadow of dirigisme and
étatisme.’71 Helping advance its fortunes are formal
institutions such as banks. In 2007 the government set
up its own development bank, the Banco de
Desenvolvimento de Angola (BDA), whose first year of
operations saw more than half the total value of its
loans going to Cabinda province, thus underlining its
political purposes.72 In 2008 the government acquired
controlling interests in two Portuguese banks.   
On the face of it, such measures may answer prayers by
national business people who, in a recent survey of
Angola’s investment climate, identify lack of access to
credit as the most serious problem they face.73 In 2009
the government launched a modest credit programme
for small commercial farmers, but there are few other
signs of official interest in promoting small or medium
enterprises. The political class may oppose independent
banks not only because they would promote social
blocs beyond their control.  
Formal rules and informal ‘encouragement’ by state
authorities limit the likelihood that substantial
autonomous business strata could emerge. The
Promotion of Angolan Private Entrepreneurs Law of
2003 adds formal suasion to informal mechanisms
coupling business interests with state patronage.  The
state has taken steps to dominate wholesale
commerce, promoting a parastatal supermarket chain
built up with Brazilian corporate expertise.  Elsewhere
in Africa, this sector is lucrative and has given rise to
large autonomous business dynasties; perhaps for that
reason in Angola the sector is being cornered in order
to reinforce state/party power, not compete with it.
The government puts foreign business under particular
pressure to engage Angolan nationals as employees, as
sources of goods and services and especially as
‘partners’ in enterprises and projects.74 In identifying
who gets access to these tasks and ‘partnerships’,
official patronage systems are always at hand. Some
pressures on foreign investors come from their own
ranks.  For example, compliance with Angolan formal
and informal regulations imposes costs on private
businesses, creating incentives for all firms to
collaborate on the same terms.75 In the bargain,
patronage systems are further reinforced.
Onshore effects of foreign corporations on state
resilience have yet to be studied systematically, but
some anecdotal and case material suggests some of the
paths of influence. Angolan elites welcome
corporations for the formal and informal benefits of
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‘partnerships’. But strong resentments can arise about
their arbitrary powers over hiring, local spending and
impacts on the environment and local economies,
which in oil extraction zones have suffered severe
damage.76 According to a 2008 survey of public
opinion, Angolans have less confidence in major
corporations than any other major institution, even less
than in political parties.77
Both the state and its corporate partners worry about
each others’ public profiles as well as their own.
Displays of corporate philanthropy led the government
to levy a special tax on large corporations called the
‘social bonus’. Until around 2002 these payments went
to Sonangol, thereafter to the central treasury. There
are no full public accounts of either sources or ultimate
uses of these funds; ‘leakage’ to clientalist networks
cannot be ruled out.  
Oil companies like Chevron and Exxon seek to show
‘social responsibility’ through charitable good works in
zones where they operate.  Increasingly, however, they
are subsidising national programmes of the United
Nations, international NGOs and bilateral agencies like
USAID. Through such patrimonial largesse, foreign
corporations exert influence over agencies mandated to
help eliminate corrupt, unequal influence in Angolan
governance.  Informants to this study with experience
of oil company philanthropy in Angola see little value
in its approaches or effects. Their negative views are
consistent with findings elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea
that cast serious doubt on stories of positive outcomes
of oil industry ‘social responsibility’.78
Like agencies in the official aid system, corporate
donors have favoured projects in health care,
education, training and infrastructure such as roads -
purposes that normally would fall to the public sector.
Corporate philanthropies followed the official and non-
governmental aid agencies in usually failing to engage
with the public sector in constructive ways.79 The
church and its institutions, and other private service
providers, were major beneficiaries of the aid system.
Towards the end of the war years, it had become clear
that aid agencies had ‘played a critical role in the
privatisation of the Angolan state and its de-linkage
from society.’80
Today, despite interesting projects to reinforce public
sector capacities, donors (including oil corporations)81
continue to by-pass and substitute for the public sector.
Such initiatives easily win government approval, as no
major state outlays are required yet officials will
usually get a share of the credit. In the longer term,
however, such foreign aid approaches can undermine
state resilience. This is especially so where, as in
Angola, they are combined with rising privatisation and
the commercialisation of health, education and other
services. The resulting stratification of services further
dissolves any social contract and can contribute to
social exclusion and the further hollowing-out of public
sector legitimacy.
Conclusion 
After nearly four decades of upheaval, Angola has
stabilised. War and rising oil wealth have reconfigured
the country’s political economy and demography.
Offshore flows eclipse onshore economic circuits and
reinforce a central autocracy whose politics follow a
logic of clientalism legitimised by the rules and
procedures of formal democracy. Despite the
pacification of politics and the undeniable gains in
collective self-esteem, there are signs of continuity,
indeed of ‘path dependence’. Decades after abandoning
Soviet-style central planning, and embracing a
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supervised but predatory kind of capitalism, the post-
colonial regime today replicates the dirigisme and
external orientation of the colonial era.  
In terms of coercive power over national territory,
Angola’s state is now more resilient than fragile. The
political game may be played in part by non-
transparent, arbitrary and personalised rules, but there
is at present no alternative version of them. The state’s
monopoly of coercive power is today virtually
complete, having marginalised putative separatist
movements both militarily and politically.  Its public-
private police system operates effectively, if sometimes
brutally.  Leadership of the security forces has been,
with only minor exceptions, loyal and unified.  Given the
absence of serious security threats, the massive size of
the military/security apparatus can be explained in
part by its politically stabilising powers to provide jobs
and income and to discourage dissent.
In terms of control over economic life, the state shows
resilience in a number of key respects, although
abundant petrodollars may mask structural
weaknesses. Its agents effectively supervise the
allocation of property and sources of rents, capital
inflows and outflows, money supply and inflation, etc.
For a variety of economic, political and military
purposes, the leadership has built up a large, competent
state holding company with a number of ‘shadow state’
functions. 
Over the informal economy, state powers and
motivations are mixed.  Officially the state seeks to
curb and strictly control it in urban areas. But
informally the stance is often one of laissez-faire, as
some of the elite’s rent- and profit-making activities
depend on informal circuits and the cheap reproduction
of a docile labour force surviving in the informal
economy. Predatory systems are thus at work in labour
markets, but potentially more destabilising is the
predatory acquisition of assets, chiefly land, on behalf
of local and foreign private interests.
Capping the appearance of state resilience is the
regime’s political legitimacy. As of 2009 that looks
unassailable. The MPLA’s triumph in the
parliamentary elections of 2008 was too massive to be
attributed only to manipulation of the system and of
ignorant and dissenting voters, though those things
certainly played a part. For memories of war are still
fresh; some people feared a return of instability like
that following the last elections in 1992. Many
Angolans may also simply prefer a ‘“delegative
democracy” where an acquiescent public accepts
whatever the regime chooses to supply.’82 All these
factors probably helped tip votes toward the ruling
party, for want of any credible alternative.
Will state resilience be consolidated?  The current
petrodollar-based development model is not that of a
‘developmental state’, being too narrowly geared to
satisfying the lifestyle preferences of elites and a few
other non-poor strata. The ‘elite bargain’ underpinning
it could be threatened by conjunctural factors, such as
the further collapse of oil revenues or severe losses in
offshore speculative investments. 
But in the longer term it faces structural challenges.
New enterprise-based elites only tenuously subservient
to regime patronage are likely to emerge. The regime
may find it hard to block that development. The
political challenge is how to accommodate and absorb
those actors – a political art in which the regime has
shown great proficiency in the past.  Less likely but not
impossible, wage- and salary-earners frustrated in their
ambitions to better their consumption, including
consumption of public services, could find political
vehicles in civil society or even a faction in the ruling
party. For these kinds of reasons the steering of
‘development’ entails far more political and social
engineering than technical modernisation.
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Ways forward
The foregoing pages have looked at state fragility and
resilience in Angola in light of the country’s deep
integration with global systems.  External players set
the stage for and helped fuel four decades of war and
economic upheaval.  Yet it was internal ones, including
a stronger army and consolidated political control, that
finally brought that terrible period to an end.   Angola’s
state and governance are thus a complex amalgam of
the weak and the strong, the domestic and the foreign.
Today Angola’s politics remain entwined with powerful
outside actors and are still politics of limited access to
assets and privileges.  State/party elites pursue their
interests on the basis of understandings with foreign
extractive and banking corporations, and with foreign
governments, not least for assurances of military
protection.  Angolan elites harbour social and
economic ambitions, but those do not now include a
developmental state pursing a socially inclusive
agenda.   
Against such a background, and the relative strength
and autonomy of key branches of the Angolan state,
what options are open to Western and international
policy makers? 
Coherence in Western policy and
global governance
Adopting a coherent perspective is one place to begin.
This paper has presented reasons to see the main
issues in Angola as not confined to its territory but
deeply entwined with interests and systems at supra-
national levels.  It has also noted reasons to see
Angola’s current economic boom as something that,
as in earlier episodes in the country’s economic
history, will go bust.  
Lenses to look at Angola’s current and future
prospects should firstly be wide enough to include
global systems, and secondly be telescopic enough to
see beyond the next few years to include the (not-too-
distant) era when oil revenues begin to taper off.
A wider view
A wider perspective would be more coherent to the
extent that it includes the array of foreign and
domestic incentives facing Angolan elites as well as
non-Angolan actors collaborating with them. Such a
view would offer a more realistic understanding of
power and of who really counts in the ‘international
community’. As a student of oil and politics in the Gulf
of Guinea puts it: ‘The oil company executives, bankers,
accountants and lawyers who haunt the lobbies of the
five-star hotels in the region are as constitutive of
today’s Gulf of Guinea as local actors.  Resources that
are criminally siphoned off by incumbents materialise
in the West’s sensible investment portfolios and tax
havens.’83
That perspective would pull into focus the structure of
incentives facing Angolan elites that stem from
international circuits of money, goods and means of
repression, and on the institutions making them non-
transparent and otherwise resistant to public control.
Among other things it would include:
• Offshore financial centres and political arrangements
that perpetuate them;
• Capital flight and the mechanisms, such as mis-
invoicing, that perpetuate them;
• Disproportionate influence exercised by extractive
industries, such as through their subsidisation and
spending powers in public life, both in Angola,
Western Europe, the USA and perhaps elsewhere;
• Military arrangements, especially with China and the
USA,
• Initiatives to make these and other private supra-
national flows (also of arms and military services)
transparent and subject to public control.
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The current world economic crisis, with the financial
sector at its heart, has exposed the massive regulatory
deficit in national and global governance. Some
political leaders have raised hopes that this governance
deficit is going to be tackled. Yet preferences for ‘soft
law’ and for corporate self-regulation are deeply
entrenched.  Political classes in the USA and Western
Europe are meeting strong push-backs from
corporations, tax havens and the financial industry
abetted by mainstream media, much of which is in
hands of corporations benefiting from non-
transparency rules and other forms of global bad
governance.   Angola’s involvement in these politics is
not clear, although tough talk from OPEC (of which
Angola holds the presidency at present) suggests its
collusion in political counter-offensives in global
forums.
A longer-term view
A longer-term perspective would be more coherent to
the extent that it looks beyond Angola’s current oil
boom, which is likely to have passed by 2020.  That
view would necessarily consider today’s development
model and its likely consequences in ten years’ time
against a backdrop of more-or-less clear trends, such
as demographic changes, and less predictable but
looming risks, such as water stress due to climate
change. Among those consequences, particular
attention should be given to the pace and direction of
change in:
• inequalities, both ‘vertical’ among social strata, and
‘horizontal’ among regions and ethno-linguistic
groups,
• distribution of productive assets, particularly land;
• domestic markets in domestically-produced goods, as
measured against the servicing of foreign markets
and reliance on imports;
• distribution of public goods, particularly water,
sanitation and health;
• development of means to clarify and settle conflicts
and to protect basic rights.
These trends underpin likely political dynamics,
including the rise of new social groupings and the
political space in which they might develop.
Also needing a longer-term view is Angola as a player
in global climate politics and as a probable victim of
climate change. The world’s current hydrocarbon-
intensive development model fosters policy incoherence
at many levels. The issue surpasses the scope of this
paper, but merits attention in the case of Angola, whose
resilience is put at risk in at least two ways: revenue
volatility (and possible decline) as petroleum is
dethroned from the centre of global energy and
investment equations; and environmental stress,
particularly related to water supplies, as climate
change intensifies. Furthermore, hydrocarbon-based
states and their corporate allies have gained powerful,
even commanding positions in geo-politics.  ‘[T]he
financial muscle of authoritarian states’, concludes a
leading British newspaper, ‘has as much bearing on the
direction of the world economy as the wealth of liberal
democracies.’84 That muscle today expresses itself in,
among other things, efforts by the hydrocarbon bloc to
block strong measures to mitigate climate change.85
Among oil exporters Angola is a relatively minor
player, but does align itself with others, including Saudi
Arabia and Russia, in discouraging alternatives to the
hydrocarbon-based model. Angola plays a role, albeit a
modest one, in the politics of the planet’s future.
Enabling a responsive state 
Foreign governments, business oracles, international
financial institutions and Washington DC think-tanks
express enthusiasm about Angola’s ‘miracle’. The
cautious development economist Paul Collier
speculates optimistically about Angola and the
autocratic model he sees it exemplifying: 
It is quite possible that the next quarter century will
see this model of the developmental autocrat ruling a
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strong state spreading to countries with better
opportunities. Angola, with its oil and its Atlantic
coastline, could well prove to be another Malaysia.86
Angola’s state is today stronger than might have been
expected. It beat back a serious Cold War effort to
overthrow it, widened its political base and consolidated
itself as a stable autocracy. But public administration and
services remain weak and unevenly spread. Consumption
and investment have shot up, but there is no sign of it
becoming a ‘developmental’ state.  Of six factors identified
by Leftwich87 as characteristic of developmental states,
Angola lacks four important ones, namely:
• a determined elite guided by a modernising vision for
the whole nation; 
• state autonomy from the interests of powerful
cliques; 
• a competent economic bureaucracy insulated from
special interests;
• the capacity for effective management of private
economic interests.
Angola does, however, possess two characteristics of
this developmental state model, namely:
• a weak and subordinated civil society; and
• an uneasy mix of repression, poor human rights and
legitimacy.
As long as powerful and poorly-regulated offshore
incentives continue to shape elite motivations and visions
of Angola’s future, the prospects for transformation – a
broad developmental vision, state autonomy from
special interests, an effective bureaucracy and
entrepreneurial class – look anything but bright.  
This conclusion has three implications:
First, as an extraverted polity, Angola’s developmental
space extends well beyond the country’s territorial
borders. The regime depends overwhelmingly on non-
transparent, supranational arrangements in realms of
military and corporate power, including the
management of financial stocks and flows. That
extraverted basis of political power seems likely to
continue, even if domestic interest blocs develop.
However, beyond 2015, after oil output and revenues
have peaked and debt payments begin to fall due,
those offshore arrangements could lose their
attractions.  Angola’s historical pattern of economic
boom and bust, and of successive development models
launched only to end up shipwrecked, appears to be
repeating itself. To escape this pernicious cycle,
Angolans themselves must gain the widest and best-
informed spaces possible for open discussion.  Today,
at a time of unprecedented economic and ecological
crisis, the means and imperatives for an in-depth
debate have intensified. Important tenets of capitalist
growth are being critically re-visited. Alternative
models appear more viable and even necessary.  It is
time to adopt a new compass and chart another way
forward.
Second, and in the meantime, a ‘developmental state’
along the lines of Vietnam or Malaysia is unlikely to
emerge in Angola. A pluralist model - a polity based
on many competing forces in an open political arena
– is also improbable.  More likely therefore is a
scenario of inequitable, unsustainable growth shaped
by state patronage backed from abroad by US
military and economic power.  Under these
circumstances, a realistic way forward in the short
term is to promote a ‘minimally responsive state’, one
that would act as chief duty-bearer toward a rights-
holding citizenry.  As the government rolls out
‘decentralisation’, formal spaces for citizen-state
interaction may open to some extent.  Precedents for
state-society engagement are already present in such
areas as the co-production of health and education
services with church bodies and NGOs, and in
consultative platforms of residents and local
authorities, or of parents and school officials. 
Third, amidst today’s economic crisis, unprecedented
opportunities are at hand to reform supra-national
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systems and incentives that promote and perpetuate
distorted and non-transparent governance both in
countries like Angola and Western democracies.  There
is a need for more active engagement by consuming
publics,88 by academic and think-tank researchers,
investigative journalists and media gatekeepers, and by
officials and public watchdogs.  As the persistence of
institutional weaknesses and dangerous inequities in
Angola can be traced to the lack of good public
governance at supra-national levels, today’s crisis is an
opportunity for progressive advances both in Angola
and elsewhere.
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For years, as a former Cold War battleground, Angola has stood out on world league
tables of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states.  Yet its army has a formidable record of domestic
and foreign combat. Its national oil company is of world class. In recent years its
economy has grown at a feverish annual rate of 18 percent. Its government has
successfully ended 40 years of violent conflict, consolidated its political base and
negotiated profitable deals with major public and private bodies of the United
States, Europe and China. For such a country, how valid is the label ‘failed state’?
In light of this seeming paradox, this paper addresses several critical questions. What
are the historical roots of conflict in Angola, and of its weak and uneven state and
political institutions? How deeply is Angola’s political economy integrated into
international systems, and what aspects of that integration help explain both the
weaknesses and strengths of state and political institutions? What formal and
informal forces and incentives are at work in Angola’s territorial political economy
that affect state and political resilience and weakness?   
It concludes by suggesting ways European and other international decision-makers
might look afresh at notions of state weakness in general, and their relevance to the
case of Angola in particular.   
